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INTRODUCTION

Homeowners in Texas may be surprised to learn that recent changes
in the Texas Property Code' may have effectively deprived them of
rights that many citizens would have considered unalienable.
As many Texas cities struggle to keep up with the costs associated
with suburban sprawl, these cities are finding it difficult to provide
new neighborhoods with essential services such as water, sewer, and
trash removal. To help their bottom line, many Texas cities have
transferred these responsibilities to homeowners' associations
(HOAs). However, in doing so cities have inadvertently created vast
patchworks of privately owned neighborhoods where many constitutional rights have been contracted away.' These de-constitutionalized
zones are growing, and the law governing such quasi-municipalities is
unclear.3
In 2001, the Texas Legislature intended to curb and regulate the
power of HOAs by enacting the Texas Residential Property Owners
Protection Act (TRPOPA). 4 However, the portion of this legislation
that deals specifically with an HOA's right to ban political signs is
problematic, and possibly in violation of the Texas Constitution. Although the legislature intended for section 202.009 of the Texas Property Code to clarify the TRPOPA statutes5 , and thereby decrease the
number of lawsuits brought against HOAs, the legislation may have
the opposite effect.
A.

A Homeowners' Hypothetical

To illustrate the problem, let us start with a hypothetical case. We
have two homeowners: Fred and Barney. Fred and Barney are longtime friends and lifelong Texas residents. The two friends recently
bought houses located across the street from each other in Bedrock
Park, a large subdivision in north Dallas. The Bedrock Park Homeowners' Association, referred to by most citizens simply as "Bedrock
Park," controls and runs the Bedrock Park neighborhood.
On New Year's Eve 2007, the two friends, while at a holiday party
with their families, were overtaken with a feeling of camaraderie and
community spirit.
1. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.009 (Vernon 2007).
2. See James C. Harrington, Homeowners Associations: Creating Deconstitutionalized Zones, TEX. LAW., Oct. 18, 2004, at 34, available at 10/18/2004 TEX. LAW. 34
(Westlaw).
3. See id.
4. Matthew Taylor Morones & William G. Gammon, Community Owners Associations, Their Dubious Power to Foreclose, and the Recent Legislation Curtailing

That Power, 66

TEX.

B.J. 218, 218 (2003);

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 202.009.

5. See Morones & Gammon, supra note 4, at 222.
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"Barney, my friend, I am feeling especially thankful this year and I
want to make a pact with you to carry out some New Year's resolutions," Fred said while watching their children play together.
"I want to make a difference in the world in the upcoming year,"
Fred said. "You know I have always wanted to be more politically
active, and this year I am going to put my money where my mouth is."
"I hear ya, Fred. I am feeling the same way," Barney replied. "You
know how I am always talking about how I should do more recycling
and stuff. Well, this year I really want to 'go green.' I really want to
be more environmentally friendly. Maybe I can start composting this
year."
"Barney, I hear what you're saying. Now that you and I have settled into our new neighborhood, let's hold each other accountable and
do some good this year."
Barney agreed wholeheartedly with his friend, and the two made a
pact to carry through with their New Year's resolutions.
Fred had been politically active in college, but after getting married
and having a daughter, he rarely participated in a good political debate. Fred resolved to be more politically active, and in order to solidify that sentiment, Fred thought it was time he got back into the
political dialogue. So, he went down to the local copy store and
worked with a graphic designer to come up with a professional-looking yard sign. Fred knew there were some restrictive covenants regarding signs in his homeowners' association agreement-although he
couldn't remember all the details-but he did remember that yard
signs couldn't have flashing lights or balloons, and that they needed to
be mounted to the ground. With this in mind, the store designed for
Fred a simple red, white, and blue sign with a message that read: "End
the War in Iraq." Fred put one sign up in his front yard and kept the
remaining five in his garage, with hopes that maybe some of his new
neighbors would also like to display a sign in their yard.
While Fred was at the copy store, Barney made good on his initial
promise and built a small wooden structure to hold the compost.
When finished, Fred and Barney beamed with pride over their new
projects. To celebrate the completion of their goals, the two men
hosted a neighborhood barbecue. To Fred's surprise, his yard sign was
a big hit. Neighbors, including those he had only waved to before,
came up to him at the party to ask him about his political views and to
talk about world events. Fred felt good that night. He felt like he had
really connected with some of his neighbors; and he was surprised at
what a great means of communication one small sign could be.
Unfortunately, the good feeling came to an abrupt end. That next
morning, Fred and Barney received letters from the Bedrock Park
Homeowners' Association. Each man received a letter stating he was
violating the HOA's covenants. In Barney's letter, the HOA reminded him that the association had a covenant banning composting.
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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As for Fred, the HOA informed him that his sign was in violation of
the HOA's covenant that banned all yard signs. The letter stated that
Fred would need to take the sign down immediately, or face a heavy
fine.
Fred and Barney were disappointed and angry. The two of them
went to visit their friend Gizmo, a local lawyer at the "Gizmo and
Associates" law firm. Gizmo took a good, long look at the letters
before making a pronouncement.
"I have some good news, and some bad news, gentlemen. Although
both of you have violated covenants found in your HOA agreement,
one of you is expressly protected by Texas law."
Fred looked at Barney and said, "Sorry ol' pal. We both knew that
Texas just wasn't ready to start composting."
"Not so fast, Fred," said Gizmo. "I am afraid Barney's activity is
explicitly protected in Texas, but your sign will need to come down."
"What are you talking about?" Fred retorted. "Don't I have some
First Amendment rights here? What about my freedom of expression? I am going to sue! I am going to sue the HOA, because this is
...
unconstitutional!"
At that point, Gizmo explained to Fred that the federal Constitution only protects citizens from interference by a state actor. Gizmo
informed Fred that the Bedrock Park HOA was a private entity, not a
municipality.
"Are you telling me that the city of Dallas couldn't send me a letter
like this, but Bedrock Park can? What's the difference? Besides, I
thought Bedrock Park was a city!" Fred said.
Fred then explained to Gizmo that everyone Fred knew assumed
that Bedrock Park was its own independent city-and they had good
reason for this assumption. Fred explained that when there was a pothole in front of his driveway, he initially called the city of Dallas to
have them fix it, but the city directed him to call Bedrock Park. Moreover, when the Bedrock Park HOA fixed the pothole, it sent out its
own maintenance vehicle to do the job. Furthermore, when Barney
noticed a problem with some equipment at the playground, he also
called the city of Dallas, but the city said the playground was the responsibility of Bedrock Park.
Fred and Barney told Gizmo that Bedrock Park was in charge of the
neighborhood's snow removal; Bedrock Park mowed the medians;
and Bedrock Park did the garbage collection. Furthermore, Bedrock
Park even had its own security force which drove vehicles that looked
nearly identical to those driven by the Dallas police force.
"How can Bedrock Park not be a city?" cried Fred. "And, hasn't
anyone noticed that our neighbors who live outside of the HOA, well,
they have like three signs each in their yards. How can that be right?"

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss1/5
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Gizmo promised his friends he would look into the matter. With
that, Fred and Barney thanked Gizmo for his time and drove back
home.
This article examines the growth and function of community associations; the problems these organizations present when dealing
with free speech issues; and the various legal theories under which
Fred could possibly prevail in his suit against the Bedrock Park HOA.
B.

Thesis

Because cities like Dallas have enacted ordinances that make
HOAs a mandatory part of subdivision development,6 the line between private and state action has been blurred. If a Texas court were
to hold that HOAs are state actors, then it would be unconstitutional
for these organizations to enforce a complete ban on political signs.
Alternatively, even if a Texas court were to conclude that HOAs are
not state actors, an HOA that enacts a total ban on political signs
would possibly still be in violation of the Texas state constitution, even
if such a ban does not invoke the federal constitution. Regardless of
the decision regarding state action, it is time that lawmakers examine
the municipal ordinances that require the creation of HOAs in new
subdivisions. These practices deprive citizens of constitutional rights
and constitutional remedies.
In order for a Texas homeowner to find legal relief from an HOA
restriction on political signs, one of three things would need to
happen:
" The HOA would need to be declared a state actor; OR
" A court would need to hold that this type of restrictive covenant was in violation of the Texas Constitution's free speech
clause, independent of any decision regarding a state action;
OR
* A Texas court would need to strike down the HOA's restrictive
covenant on grounds that it violated public policy.
Part II of this article explores the background history of HOAs and
the legal issues surrounding these types of organizations. Part III explains the connection between free speech and state action by analyzing Supreme Court decisions on the subject. Part IV outlines the
differences between federal and Texas laws on these issues, while Part
V examines how other states have ruled on HOAs. Finally, Part VI
describes the public policy argument, and Part VII offers some potential solutions.

6.

DALLAS, TEX., DEVELOPMENT CODE, ORDINANCE

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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BACKGROUND

The Growth and Function of Community Associations

Nearly one in six Americans lives in a community association.7
These organizations have seen rapid growth since their inception in
the 1960s.8 In 1970, there were approximately 10,000 of these organizations in the United States.9 By 2008, this number had grown to an
estimated 300,800 community associations, with approximately 59.5
million Americans living within some type of community association.' ° Additionally, in the southwest and west, some municipalities
have required that new residential developments be governed by an
HOA."
These types of organizations are often referred to as "community
owners associations," or "common interest developments."' 2 Typically, they are non-profit organizations made up of property owners
from the subdivision.' 3 A board of directors, elected by the members,
usually oversees the organization.14 The developer of the subdivision
often establishes this type of organization, prior to final plat approval,
in order to manage the common property of the subdivision and to
protect the developer's interests.' 5 At the heart of such organizations
are the restrictive covenants that property owners must follow.1 6
These restrictive covenants are private agreements, and as such, they
"operate entirely outside of federal constitutional restrictions."17
As cities struggle to finance essential services such as water, sewers,
and roads to fast-growing suburbs, many cities have entered into questionable "bargaining" agreements with HOAs. 8 Many municipalities
now require the subdivision developer to establish a community association so that the association will be in charge of providing the municipal services to these new neighborhoods.1 9 These agreements,
7. Community Associations Institute (CAI): Industry Data, http://www.caionline.
org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008) (stating that in 2008, nearly 60 million
Americans lived in community associations).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictionson Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE &
ENVTrL. L. 233, 236 (2006).
12. Id. at 233; Morones & Gammon, supra note 4, at 220.
13. Morones & Gammon, supra note 4, at 220.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 234.
17. Id.
18. See Steven Siegel, The Public Role in Establishing PrivateResidential Communities: Towards a New Formulationof Local Government Land Use Policies that Eliminates the Legal Requirements to Privatize New Communities in the United States, 38
URB. LAW. 859, 872-73 (2006).
19. Id. at 872.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss1/5
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although not prohibited by law, have created vast stretches of neighborhoods that are effectively controlled, not by the state, but by a
"private government. 2 °
As these associations have grown in size and power, and as more
cities have mandated their formation, homebuyers may find that they
have little choice but to purchase a home in an HOA-controlled community. 2 1 Additionally, homeowners may be surprised to learn that
certain constitutional rights, such as freedom of expression, are not
protected once they sign the HOA covenant agreement.2 2
1. Regulating HOAs in Texas
In 2001, the Texas legislature sought to regulate the actions of
HOAs.23 Prior to this legislation, Texas HOAs had broad power over
homeowners, including the power to foreclose on homeowners for a
failure to pay the fees stemming from the violation of community
rules. For example, in 1997, HOAs filed more than 1,050 foreclosure
suits in Harris County alone.2 4
Legislation to regulate HOAs came about primarily in response to a
public outcry over these foreclosures. Media coverage surrounding
the plight of a Houston widow, Wenonah Blevins, increased the public's interest in HOA legislation. 26 The 84 year-old Blevins had fallen
behind in her HOA dues by $876.27 When Blevins was unable to pay
the debt, and the additional $2,941.50 in HOA attorney fees, the HOA
evicted Blevins from her home, and then sold the $150,000 home for
$5000.28 In 2001 the Texas legislature, in response to media coverage
of Blevin's story, passed a measure to curb the power of HOAs. 2 9 The
legislation was known as the Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act (TRPOPA).3 0
TRPOPA created a detailed statutory scheme to regulate HOAs. 3 '
The legislation addressed hot-button issues including: procedural stan20. See id. at 866-67.
21. See id. at 866-69.
22. The issue of community associations and constitutional rights has been the
subject of various scholarly writings. See, e.g., Chadderdon, supra note 11; EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL

(1994); Karen Ellert Pena, Comment, Reining in Property
Owners' Associations' Power: Texas's Need for a Comprehensive Plan, 33 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 323 (2002); Siegel, supra note 18.
23. Morones & Gammon, supra note 4, at 218-20.
24. Id. at 221.
25. Id. at 218-22.
26. Id. at 218.
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT

27. Ross Guberman, Home is Where the Heart Is, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at
42, 44, available at 2004-Dec LegalAff 42 (Westlaw).

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.

Morones & Gammon, supra note 4, at 218.

Id.
Id at 222.
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dards for HOAs, public record filings, public disclosures, and regulation of foreclosure actions.3 2 In 2003, the Texas legislature passed
additional TRPOPA legislation that barred community associations
from prohibiting water conservation, composting, or drip irrigation.3 3
In 2005, the legislature again added to the TRPOPA legislation by
creating a provision granting homeowners the right to display signs
advertising a candidate or a ballot issue during an election.34
2.

HOAs, Political Signs, and the 100-Day Election Window

In June 2005, the legislation regarding HOAs and political signs became effective.3 5 Under Texas Property Code § 202.009, HOAs are
prohibited from enforcing a total ban on political signs during an election season. 36 Under the statute, political signs are signs advertising a
candidate or an issue that appears on an election ballot.3 7 The statute
provides that HOAs must allow "one or more" of these signs to be
displayed for ninety days prior to the related election, and then for ten
days after that election.3 8 Unfortunately, under a plain reading of the
statute, outside of that 100-day election window, the HOA can enforce a total ban on signs for candidates or ballot issues. Furthermore,
because the statute defines "political signs" so narrowly, it appears
that an HOA can enact a total ban on all signs with a general political
message, like Fred's "End the War in Iraq" sign.
3.

A Dallas City Ordinance Mandates the Creation of HOAs

In addition to the murky legal issues surrounding HOAs and free
speech, some Texas cities have compounded this problem by mandating the creation of HOAs for new subdivisions. Take for example, the
building codes for the city of Dallas. In Dallas, the law regulating
planned unit developments (PUDs) contains the following language:
Prior to final plat approval, the owner(s) of the Property must execute an instrument creating a homeowners association for the maintenance of common areas, screening walls, landscape
areas, private
39
streets and other functions. (Ord. Nos. 224777)
Because Dallas has required the formation of these organizations,
the line between state and private action has been muddled.
32. Stephen Cochran, Texas Practice: Consumer Rights and Remedies § 7.16 (3d
ed. & Supp. 2007).
33. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.007 (Vernon 2007).

34. Id. § 202.009.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

39. DALLAS, TEX., DEVELOPMENT CODE, ORDINANCE 22477 ch. 51, § 2(j) (1995).
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss1/5
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B.

Are HOAs State Actors?

The threshold issue in the analysis of whether it is unconstitutional
for an HOA to ban political signs depends on whether any state action
is involved.40 This question has been widely debated, 41 but for purposes of this article, I will focus on the status of HOAs in Texas. As of
this writing, no court in Texas has ruled on the question as to whether
an HOA is a state actor. Because it is only a matter of time before the
state must weigh in on this issue, it is important to examine what the
U.S. Supreme Court and other states have decided regarding this matter. To understand the issues involved, it is first necessary to give a
brief survey of the five U.S. Supreme Court decisions that would most
likely be implicated if, and when, a case involving an HOA restriction
on free speech comes before a Texas court.
III.

A.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The Ladue Decision and Free Speech Protection

The U.S. Supreme Court has been adverse to municipal ordinances
that completely ban a homeowner's right to display political signs on
their property. In 1994, in Ladue v. Gilleo, the Court struck down a
municipality's anti-sign ordinance.4 2 In that case, the plaintiff, Margaret Gilleo, wanted to protest against the first Gulf War by placing
signs in her home's windows.4 3 The city of Ladue prohibited these
types of signs.
The Supreme Court stated that although cities could impose "reasonable time, place and manner restrictions," cities could not place a
total ban on political signs." The Court held that "governments may
regulate the physical characteristics of signs."4 5 However, the Court
ruled that the city of Ladue went too far in this regulation by calling
for a complete ban on political signs.4 6 According to the Court, the
city ordinance:
[had] almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important. It has totally foreclosed
that medium to political, religious, or personal messages. Signs that
react to a local happening or express a view on a controversial
4 7 issue
both reflect and animate change in the life of a community.
40. Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 240.
41. Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 242; Steven Siegel, The Constitutionand Private
Government: Toward the Recognition of ConstitutionalRights in Private Residential
Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.461,
471-72 (1998).
42. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
43. Id. at 45.
44. See id. at 56.
45. Id. at 48.
46. See id. at 58.
47. Id. at 54.
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The City argued that their ordinance was constitutional because it
sought merely to regulate the "time, place or manner" of speech, and
the ordinance left open the possibility of homeowners using hand-held
signs, handbills, bumper stickers, and other forms of communication.4 8
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that "[d]isplaying a
sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct
from placing the same sign someplace
else, or conveying the same test
49
or picture by other means.
The Court went on to state that allowing residential signs has a special place in this country's concept of fundamental rights.5 ° The Court
noted that "[a] special respect for individual liberty in the home has
long been part of our culture and our law."5 1 The Court declared:
Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of
communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited
mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute....
A person who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to reach
neighbors, an5 2audience that could not be reached nearly as well by
other means.
Consequently, under the holding of Ladue, it is clear that a city
would be prohibited from following the provisions of Texas Property
Code, section 202.009. The statute prescribes that HOAs must allow
homeowners to post signs for candidates and ballot issues during a
100-day window surrounding an election. However, because the statute defines "political signs" as signs that relate specifically to a candidate or ballot issue, a sign, like the sign in Ladue, that expressed an
opinion about foreign policy could be prohibited at any time.
Ladue clarified the law regarding free speech and state actors.
Under Ladue, a state actor can make some "reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions," but a state actor cannot completely ban a
homeowner's right to free expression on their property. The question
then becomes: "Is an HOA a state actor?".
B.

Federal State Actor Tests: Four Case Studies

The Supreme Court has advanced a number of different tests to
determine when a private entity, like an HOA, becomes a state actor.
The four tests include: (1) Shelley v. Kraemer, and the "judicial enforcement" theory of state action; (2) Marsh v. Alabama, and the
"company town" approach; (3) Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, and
the "sufficiently close nexus" test; and (4) Brentwood Academy v. Ten48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 57.
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nessee Secondary School Athletic Association, and the "entwinement"
theory of state action.53
It seems likely that before a Texas court would hear a case involving
free speech and an HOA, a few factors would hypothetically need to
be in place. First, the facts would need to be such that, arguably, the
plaintiff had little choice but to live in and accept the terms of an
HOA.5 4 Second, the HOA would need to be attempting to enforce a
restrictive covenant that bans all political signs. If these facts were
present, a Texas court would most likely begin their analysis with the
question of whether the HOA is a state actor, and therefore under the
authority of the U.S. Constitution.
1. Shelley v. Kraemer: The "Judicial Enforcement"
Theory of State Action
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that judicial enforcement of a
racially discriminatory covenant in a private contract qualified as state
action. 6 In Shelley, an African-American purchased property in Missouri.57 The property had attached to it a restrictive covenant limiting
ownership to Caucasians. 8 The purchased property and nearly fifty
neighboring properties were bound by this covenant.5 9 After the sale
to an African-American, one of the other owners within that group
brought action seeking to have the racially restrictive covenant enforced.6" The Supreme Court of Missouri decided that a racially restrictive covenant could be enforced.6 1 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed.6 2 The Supreme Court reversed the decision stating that
such a covenant violated the Equal Protection Clause.6 3 The Court
held that when the state of Missouri attempted to enforce the covenant, this amounted to state action, and therefore the private agreement was subject to constitutional review.6 4
The Shelley decision was, and remains, controversial. On the surface, the holding seems to stand for the idea that private agreements
are subject to constitutional constraints whenever these agreements
53. Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 242; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1946); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531
U.S. 288 (2001).
54. Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 243.
55. See id.
56. See Shelley, 334 U.S. 1.
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 6.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 23.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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are subject to judicial enforcement. 65 Many lower courts have concluded that the Shelley ruling should be applied only to racially restrictive covenants.6 6 However, there are a number of cases where courts
have applied Shelley to other types of restrictive covenants.6 7
Legal scholar, Steven Siegel, has proposed that courts should apply
a "landuse reading" of Shelley.68 Under this interpretation of Shelley,
the ruling would be limited to situations where the private covenants,
if they had been a product of the state, would be found unconstitutional. 69 In these situations, Siegel proposes that courts should intervene in certain private contracts and strike down such agreements as
being unconstitutional.7 °
In applying this theory to Texas HOAs and political signs, if a Texas
court were to adopt this "land-use" interpretation of Shelley, it is
likely that the court would conclude that section 202.009 was unconstitutional. Under this reading of Shelley, if a city were given the power
that section 202.009 gives HOAs, that city could effect a total ban on
signs with messages such as "Stop the War in Iraq." As the decision in
Ladue demonstrates, the First Amendment prohibits this type of total
ban.7 '
2.

Marsh v. Alabama: The "Company Town"
Theory of State Action

The case of Marsh v. Alabama demonstrates the second possible
analogy that a court might use when analyzing HOAs and free speech
rights. The ruling in Marsh is known as the "company town" theory of
state action.
In Marsh, the plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted of trespass after distributing religious material while standing on a sidewalk
in Chickasaw, Alabama. 72 Chickasaw was a "company town," privately owned and managed by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.7 3
The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation had posted a public notice stating
that solicitation was not permitted within the company town.7 4 Marsh
was warned that if she continued to distribute religious material in
violation of the company's rule, she would be charged with trespassing
65. Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 244.
66. Id.
67. See generally Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339
(M.D. Fla. 1991); West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196 (Ohio Ct. Com.
P1. 1969).
68. Siegel, supra note 41, at 501.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52-58 (1994).
72. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1946).
73. Id. at 502.
74. Id. at 503.
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on private property.7 5 After Marsh refused to comply, a deputy sheriff arrested her.76
Marsh argued that the city's actions violated her First Amendment
right to free speech.7 7 The Alabama Court of Appeals held that
Chickasaw was a private entity and not a state actor subject to the
First Amendment; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision.7 8
The U.S. Supreme Court declared that if Chickasaw belonged to a
municipality, "it would have been clear that appellant's conviction
must be reversed. ' 79 The Court went on to state that the corporation's property interest did not settle the question as to whether the
company town was a state actor. 80 Writing for the majority, Justice
Black concluded that no matter who owned Chickasaw, it was imperative that the "channels of communication remain free." 81 The Court
noted that a ruling in favor of Gulf Shipbuilding would disenfranchise
many U.S. citizens because, at the time of the Marsh ruling, many
people in the United States lived in company-owned towns. 82 Justice
Black held that there was no reason to deprive the citizens of company-owned towns of their First Amendment liberties when individuals in state-run municipalities enjoyed such freedoms. 83
The fact that Chickasaw had "all the characteristics of any other
American town"84 appears to have been dispositive in this case. In
concluding that Chickasaw was a state actor, the Marsh Court noted
that, except for private ownership, the company town functioned just
like any other town.85
In applying the Marsh ruling to Texas HOAs, it is possible that
under this analysis a Texas court could conclude that an HOA is a
state actor. A Dallas Morning News article from February 9, 2008,
illustrates the way in which one Texas HOA is quite similar to the
company town described in Marsh.86 The newspaper article centers
on the HOA known as the "Valley Ranch Association" of Irving,
Texas.8 7 This association is described as a "mega-homeowners' association" that includes "more than 30 subdivisions and 30,000 re75. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 503-04.
Id.
Id. at 504, 509-10.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505-06.
Id. at 507.
See id.
Id. at 508-09.
See id. at 508-10.
Id. at 506-08.
Brandon Formby, Valley Ranch Homeowners' Association Election Less Than

Neighborly,

DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Feb. 9, 2008, available at http://www.dallas

news.com/sharedcontent/dws/dnlatestnews/stories/021008valleyranch.330caac.html.
87. Id.
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sidents." 88 While some people may view HOAs as small community
organizations that simply regulate paint colors and trash pick-up days,
the Valley Ranch Association goes far beyond that. The Valley Ranch
Association collects $180 per $100,000 of assessed property value and
manages a $2 million budget.8 9 Additionally, the Valley Ranch Association is concerned with far more than regulating mailbox placement;
the Valley Ranch Association maintains the neighborhood's infrastructure, including parks and canal walkways.9" In describing Valley
Ranch, one resident said, "we're really like our own city."'"
Because some Texas HOAs, like Valley Ranch, encompass such a
large population, have such comprehensive duties, and appear-essentially-like an independent city, it is possible that under the "company town" theory of Marsh, such an HOA would be deemed a state
actor, and its residents entitled to First Amendment protections.
3.

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison: The "Sufficiently
Close Nexus" Test

Alternatively, even if a Texas court were to reject the state actor
tests of Shelley and Marsh, a Texas HOA could qualify as a state actor
under the "sufficiently close nexus" test of Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison. In Jackson, the plaintiff sued a privately-owned utility company after the company disconnected her electricity.92 The plaintiff
argued that because the company had failed to provide adequate notice, her due process rights had been violated.9 3 The plaintiff based
her suit on the theory that because the state licensed the private utility, and because the utility was essentially a statewide monopoly, the
utility was a state actor.9 4 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.9 5 The
Court concluded that the essential inquiry was whether there was a
"sufficiently close nexus" between the conduct of the utility company
and the state in order to conclude that the utility was a state actor.9 6
Under Jackson's "sufficiently close nexus" test, state regulation is
not enough to create a state actor. The fact that Texas's legislature
has chosen to regulate HOAs would not by itself make an HOA a
state actor. However, the Jackson Court concluded that when the
state has "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with
the private actor, that private entity may be considered a state actor.9 7
Under this theory, it is possible for an HOA covenant to qualify as a
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 346-47 (1974).
Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 349-51, 358.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 357-58.
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state action.98 Because the city of Dallas has required the creation of
HOAs in new developments, 99 it is possible that a Texas court could
find that this requirement, and the interdependence that follows, is
evidence of a "sufficiently close nexus," and therefore, state action.
4.

Brentwood Academy: The "Entwinement"
Theory of State Action

The fourth, and final, federal state actor test pertinent to this analysis comes from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association.a00 In that
case, Brentwood Academy was a member of the non-profit Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association ("Athletic Association").11012
The Athletic Association regulated high school sports in Tennessee.
After the school and the association had a disagreement over recruitment policies, the Athletic Association sued Brentwood Academy, alleging that the school had violated the Athletic Association's football
recruitment policies.1 0 3 Brentwood Academy countersued the Athletic Association, claiming that the organization was a state actor, and
that as a state
actor, it had violated the First and Fourteenth
10 4
Amendments.
The Supreme Court concluded that although the Athletic Association was a not-for-profit private corporation, the association qualified
as a state actor.10 5 The Court held that its decision was based largely
upon the excessive "entwinement" between Tennessee public school
administrators and the Athletic Association. 6 As evidence of this
"entwinement," the Court cited the fact that nearly all of the public
10 7
high schools in Tennessee belonged to the Athletic Association.
Furthermore, public state-funded schools made up an overwhelming
majority of the voting membership of the Athletic Association. 10 8 The
Court concluded that because the Athletic Association was essentially
managed by public school officials, the Athletic Association was an
extension of the public schools. 0 9 The public schools that belonged to
the Athletic Association were "seen as exercising their own authority
to meet their own responsibilities.""0
98. See id.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

DALLAS, TEX., DEVELOPMENT CODE, ORDINANCE

22477 ch. 51, § 20) (1995).

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
Id. at 290-93.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 299-300.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
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If a Texas court were to rely on the "entwinement" test, it is possible that an HOA could be found to be a state actor. This result is
more likely to be found in a case involving a city, like Dallas, where
the city's own ordinance has effectively made HOAs a mandatory part
of new development. This arrangement is similar to the facts in Brentwood Academy. The HOA is ostensibly a private organization, but it
has been created under the mandate of the city's authority, in order to
carry out the city's responsibilities.
It is evident from a brief summary of the four predominant state
action theories that a Texas court could hold that an HOA is a state
actor under the U.S. Constitution. However, our state action analysis
does not end there; an examination of Texas state law is also required.

IV.

TEXAS LAW

The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a state may grant more
expansive rights to free speech than those provided by the U.S. Constitution.'1 1 Furthermore, even if a court concludes that a private entity has not violated the U.S. Constitution's free speech clause, it is
still possible that the entity may have violated the Texas Constitution's
free speech clause. To make a determination on this issue, it is necessary to examine two elements: (1) the free speech clause of the Texas
Constitution, and (2) the Texas test for state action.
A.

Free Speech and the Texas Constitution

The Texas Constitution frames its free speech clause in the affirmative. This phrasing, while subtle, creates important differences between the state constitution and the federal provisions. The Texas
Constitution states:
Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that priviever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech
lege; and no law 1shall
2
or of the press.'
This provision in the Texas state constitution can be contrasted with
the provision in the U.S. Constitution." 3 The U.S. Constitution
frames "freedom of expression" in negative terms and restricts the
government from interfering with such freedoms. 4 Rather than simply prohibiting the government from restricting free speech, the Texas
affirmatively grants its citizens the right to express
Constitution
1 15
themselves.
111. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
112. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Harrington, supra note 2.
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In underscoring these differences, a federal court declared that the
Texas Constitution's free speech clause was "broader" in scope than
the corresponding provision in the U.S. Constitution." 6 This idea was
echoed by a Texas appellate court which concluded that the "Texas
Constitution provides broader rights of free speech than those granted
by the First Amendment."11 7 Consequently, under Texas law, when a
court is evaluating statutes that place restrictions on speech, these
statutes must be strictly scrutinized.11 8 Statutory restrictions on free
speech are not permitted unless the restrictions are necessary to serve
a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve such
ends.1 1 9
Thirty-five of the states have free speech clauses that, like Texas's,
are framed in the affirmative. In such states, this affirmative language
has enabled some plaintiffs to prevail in "free speech" claims against
community associations. In California, a court held that under this
type of affirmative free speech clause, a community association was a
state actor.120 Moreover, in New Jersey, a state court determined that
New Jersey's affirmative free speech clause 12granted
its residents
1
broader protection than the First Amendment.
As with the federal Constitutional provisions, in order to analyze if
an HOA has violated the state's free speech clause, it is first necessary
to determine if the HOA is a state actor under Texas law. There are
two factors weighing in favor of a Texas court holding that an HOA is
a state actor under the state constitution: (1) the test to determine a
state actor is relatively easy to satisfy, and (2) there is precedent from
other states with similar constitutional language.
B.

The Texas Test for State Action

Under Texas law, the state actor test appears to be a rather liberal
standard. The analysis focuses on the level of involvement between
the government and the private entity. Although Texas courts have
not produced a bright-line rule, it seems that "interdependence" and
performance of state responsibilities figure prominently in the

analysis. 122
When a government has inserted itself into a position of interdependence with a public entity, it must be recognized as a joint participant
116. Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 563 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003).
117. Maloy v. City of Lewisville, 848 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993,
no writ).
118. Operation Rescue v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Se. Tex., Inc., 975
S.W.2d 546, 559-60 (1998).
119. Id.
120. Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982).
121. Comm'n for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929
A.2d 1060 (2007).
122. Jones v. Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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with that entity. 123 Moreover, when the state entrusts a private group
with performance of functions that are traditionally governmental in
nature, the conduct of the private entity is converted into a state action for purposes of a free speech analysis under the Texas Constitution.' 24 Additionally, when a court is analyzing First Amendment
issues, a private group becomes a state actor when a government official coerced, encouraged,or suggested actions taken by the group.'
The "state actor" test in Texas, as shown by Texas case law, is a
liberal test. Certainly, under this test some HOAs would qualify as
state actors. To succeed under this legal theory, a homeowner would
first argue that in enacting section 202.009, the Texas legislature has
encouraged a private entity to deprive Texas citizens of their free
speech rights.
Second, a homeowner would point to the broad range of services
that HOAs provide. Because many cities have effectively transferred
the responsibility for providing services such as water, sewer, and
trash removal to HOAs, these cities have become so intertwined with
and dependant upon the HOAs as to effectively convert the HOA into
a government agent.
Furthermore, because cities like Dallas require an HOA to be established before the city grants certain building permits, a plaintiff
could argue these requirements amount to state action. With such
laws in place, cities like Dallas have "essentially foreclosed the option
of constructing residential subdivisions in which all traditionally municipal services are provided by the municipality.' ' 126 The existence of
such ordinances undermines the assertion that the rise and proliferation of HOAs is purely market driven. 127 These types of zoning policies have a "coercive and limiting effect on housing consumers and
producers. 1 128 Such development requirements subject a large number of homeowners to "a
private land use regime that many neither
129
desire nor understand.
When fast growing cities have these types of ordinances, it certainly
weakens the argument that homebuyers have a choice to live within
an HOA. In many instances, the more- affordable single-family
homes are located in the suburbs and the planned unit communities.
Furthermore, even in the city's core, older neighborhoods are often
coming under the control of newly formed HOAs that may attach restrictive covenants to the property. Consequently, prospective
123. Id. (describing a federal court test used to determine how government actions
are viewed under "state action" doctrine).
124. Weaver v. AIDS Servs. of Austin, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 798, 800-03 (Tex. App.Austin 1992, writ denied).
125. Id. at 801.
126. Siegel, supra note 18, at 893.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 906.
129. Id.
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homebuyers may argue that city zoning provisions have effectively denied them the option of purchasing a home that is not governed by an
HOA.
All of these factors: the city mandates, the transfer of municipal
responsibilities, and the lack of choice, could influence a Texas court
to hold that an HOA is a state actor. Texas courts are also likely to
look to other state court decisions for guidance. Although state courts
have not been unanimous, a number of jurisdictions have concluded
that an HOA can be a state actor.
V.

A.

OTHER STATES' DECISIONS

California and the Laguna decision

A California court ruled that a community association qualified as a
state actor under the California Constitution's free speech clause in
Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundationof Laguna Hills.13 0
In Laguna, a community association refused to allow an outside publishing company to distribute its newspaper in the association's neighborhood. 3 The community association produced its own give-away
newspaper and stated that the prohibition against outside publications
was necessary for the association to recoup its losses.13 2
The Laguna court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins for guidance.133 In Pruneyard,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state constitution could provide
greater rights on free speech than the federal Constitution.1 34 The
Laguna court declared that, "it could be argued that the [Pruneyard]
decision, by implication, stands for the proposition, in California, that
a private individual can be held to have violated the state constitutional rights of another, at least the latter's free speech rights."' 35
The Laguna court stated that although it chose a narrower interpretation of Pruneyard,even under that interpretation the community association qualified as a state actor.13 6 After determining that the
community association was a state actor, the court stated that the association impermissibly discriminated against the free speech rights of
the plaintiff-rights
given to the plaintiff by the California
137
Constitution.
Under the reasoning of Laguna, when a state constitution's free
speech clause is broader than that of the federal Constitution, the
state has broad police power to enforce its own constitutional provi130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 829 (1982).
Id. at 815.
Id. at 819-820.
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 825 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 829.
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sions."3 Additionally, although the Laguna court noted that the community association was not a "company town" as seen in Marsh v.
Alabama, the association was also not a traditional municipality. 39
The Laguna court described the association as a "hybrid" mix between company town and municipality, and it concluded that because
the association was a quasi-municipality, and because the association
discriminated against outside publications, the scales tipped in favor
of finding the community association to be a state actor. 4 °
If a Texas court were to adopt the reasoning of Laguna, it seems
possible that an HOA could be held to be a state actor. Because
Texas and California both have state constitutions that frame a free
speech clause in the affirmative, and because many Texas HOAs, like
the community association in Laguna, could arguably be characterized
as quasi-municipalities, it is possible that if a case with similar facts
came before a Texas court, the court could conclude that a Texas
HOA is a state actor. Under the law of Laguna, a total ban on political signs by an HOA would be struck down for violating the Texas
State Constitution.
B.

Florida

A Florida case illustrates another possible application of Supreme
Court precedent to a case involving a community association and First
Amendment rights. In Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North Condominium, Inc., condominium owners successfully sued their condominium association when the association sought to prohibit them from
flying the American flag.1 41 The Florida district court held that when
the state attempted to enforce the association's flag ban, this transformed the private covenant agreement into a state action governed
by the First Amendment.1 4 2 The Florida court cited the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions in Shelley and Marsh as controlling.1 4 3
In light of the persuasive authority of the Gerber decision, it is possible that a Texas court could use similar reasoning to hold that an
HOA is a state actor.
C.

Kansas

It is worth noting a Kansas case where the court ruled that an HOA
was not a state actor. Although this outcome would not be desirable
for a Texas homeowner in a suit against an HOA, the Kansas court's
reasoning could actually prove helpful for the homeowner's argument.
138.
139.
140.
141.
1991).
142.
143.

See id.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
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In Ross v. Hatfield, the homeowners sued their HOA, claiming that
an HOA covenant banning satellite dishes was unenforceable because
the covenant violated the First Amendment. 1" In Ross, the court said
the critical issue was whether the HOA was a state actor. 145 The
plaintiffs relied on Shelley v. Kraemer, arguing that a state court's enforcement of the covenant would transform the covenant into a state
action. 14 6 Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that even if Shelley's
holding on unconstitutional covenants did not apply, Marsh's "company town" theory did. 147 The court rejected the Shelley claim, but
focused its attention 1 on
comparing the facts of the case to the com48
pany town in Marsh.
The Kansas court ultimately rejected the Marsh "company town"
theory,'149 but the court's reasoning may be dispositive in future cases
involving HOAs. The court stated that the subdivision in question
was not "sufficiently similar to the company-owned town in Marsh to
make that case applicable."' 50 To support this decision the court declared that the subdivision lacked:
[t]he attributes of a regular American town. For example, it does
not provide its own police or fire protection, its own schools or its
own system of trash collection1 5or sewage disposal, which are functions of a typical municipality. '
The court distinguished the facts of Ross from the facts in Marsh by
declaring that traditional municipalities provide a broader range of
amenities than HOAs. 52 However, this line of thinking may not adequately reflect the realities of today's HOA. If such services are the
sign of state actor, maybe HOAs are state actors after all. Large
HOAs provide services such as "street cleaning, trash collection,
maintenance of open space, and security." '5 3 In fact, some HOAs
provide all of the services mentioned by the Ross court, with the exception of public schools. Under the standard put forth by the Ross
court, it is possible that a Texas court could find that a large HOA,
which provided many traditional municipal services, was indeed a
state actor.
Alternatively, even if a Texas court were to declare unambiguously
that an HOA was not a state actor, it is possible that a restrictive covenant could be struck down in two situations: (1) if a court determines
that under a broad application of the Texas Constitution's free speech
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Ross v. Hatfield, 640 F. Supp. 708, 709-10 (D. Kan. 1986).
Id. at 709.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 711-12.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id.
See id.
Siegel, supra note 41, at 467.
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clause, the clause applies not just to state actors, but also to private
entities like HOAs; or (2) if, regardless of the question of state action,
the covenant violates public policy.
VI.

THE PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT

A restrictive covenant that violates public policy is void and unenforceable. If a Texas homeowner is unable to find relief under either
the "state actor" test or the "broad power of the Texas Constitution"
theory, a homeowner may argue that a total ban on political signs is
bad public policy.
A New Jersey court acknowledged that the public policy argument
was a viable legal remedy for homeowners seeking relief from unreasonable HOA covenants. In 2007, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners'

Association.154 Although the case was ultimately decided in favor of
the HOA,' 55 the public policy argument is instructive.
In Twin Rivers, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded its opinion with a public policy analysis.156 The court stated it had enumerated eight "factors that courts should consider in determining whether
restrictive covenants are 'reasonable' and thus enforceable. ' 157 One
of the eight factors included, "whether the parties had a viable pur-

pose' 15which
did not at the time interfere with existing ... public pol8

icy."
Another factor examined "[w]hether the covenant interferes
with the public interest. ' 159 The court declared that in evaluating
these issues the "highest source of public policy" was the state's
constitution. 160

The Twin Rivers court ultimately decided to uphold the association's restrictive covenant primarily because the covenant did allow
homeowners to "post a sign in any window of their residence and
outside in the flower beds so long as the sign was no more that three
feet from the residence. ' 161 Because the association did not enact a
total ban on political signs, and because the covenant allowed
162 for
ground-mounted political yard signs, the covenant was upheld.
The Twin Rivers ruling is especially instructive when analyzing the
recent Texas TRPOPA legislation. The Twin Rivers statute can be distinguished from the Texas statute because Twin Rivers explicitly al154. Comm'n for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929
A.2d 1060 (2007).
155. Id. at 1076.
156. Id. at 1075-76.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1064.
159. Id. at 1075-76.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1064.
162. Id. at 1073-74.
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lowed for yard signs.1 63 On the other hand, under a plain reading of
the Texas statute, an HOA could ban all signs that were not advertising a candidate or ballot issue.1 64 In Twin Rivers, the court declared
that the state's own constitution was the standard by which a court
should evaluate the public policy of free speech restrictions.1 6 5 In
Texas, because the state Constitution provides broad free speech protection, a Texas court could rightly hold that a total ban on political
signs violated public policy, and was therefore unenforceable.
In sum, a homeowner could win a suit against their HOA under a
number of possible legal theories. A Texas court could hold that the
HOA is a state actor and that an HOA's ban on all political signs
violated the federal constitution. More likely, a Texas court could
hold that the HOA is a state actor for purposes of the Texas free
speech clause, and therefore a total ban of political signs would be
prohibited because it violates the Texas Constitution. Finally, a Texas
court could strike down such restrictive covenants on the grounds that
they violate public policy.
Regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of each legal theory, the Texas TRPOPA legislation is flawed. The TRPOPA legislation has made specific provisions for composting, but has failed to
allow for political speech.
VII.

A.

CONCLUSION

Remedies

The Texas TRPOPA legislation is flawed and two actions must be
considered in order to remedy this section of the Texas Property
Code.
First, section 202.009 needs to be modified in order to prevent unnecessary litigation and to avoid conflict with the state constitution.
This modification could be as simple as prohibiting HOAs from banning all political signs. An amendment giving homeowners the right
to display at least one political sign on their property is an appropriate
"time, place, manner" restriction that avoids completely depriving
homeowners of a valuable means of communication.
Second, municipalities need to reevaluate their policies on HOAs.
Although granting HOAs greater control has saved cities money, it
has inadvertently created a large patchwork of privately-controlled
neighborhoods where Constitutional protections do not apply. For
this reason, the time is right for the Texas legislature to revisit the
Texas Property Code and create a more detailed statutory framework
to guide cities and govern HOAs, so that citizens are not deprived of
their fundamental rights or constitutional remedies.
163. Id.
164. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.009 (Vernon 2007).
165. Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1076.
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A Return to the Homeowners' Hypothetical

Back in Bedrock Park, Barney cheers at the news that the HOA
cannot prevent him from composting. Meanwhile, Fred is dejected to
learn that under Texas law, he cannot keep his one small sign posted
in his yard.
After hearing the news, Fred and Barney stand on Fred's front
lawn. The two friends look out at their neighbors' homes across the
street. These neighbors live outside the Bedrock Rock boundary and
are not governed by the HOA, and for that reason Fred and Barney
are able to witness a diverse political dialogue taking place. One red
brick house has a sign protesting the war, while the house next to it
has a sign supporting the president. A large ranch-style home has a
sign warning drivers to: "Slow down, Children at Play," while an adjacent homeowner has put up a sign encouraging residents to use the
local recycling center.
"Doesn't seem fair," says Barney looking out at the other houses.
"Those guys get to express their opinions. The Bedrock Park ban
seems completely un-American."
Fred doesn't respond to his friend. He just picks up his sign, folds it
in half, and places it in the trashcan. Fred's yard is now just a flat
expanse of grass. Barney looks to Fred, but Fred remains silent.
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